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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
If the tax deed were completely regular in all respects, there
would be real ownership and no need to consider prescription.
Merely because the original error originated in a public office
is no reason why the general principles and rules of acquisitive
prescription should not apply.
MINERAL RIGHTS*
Harriet S. Daggett**
In Union Oil Company of California v. Touchet,1 a landowner
sold a 1/32 royalty interest. About five years later he leased
the land. Thereafter, the lease was amended to give the lessee
the right to pool the tract without further consent from the
lessor and to allocate production on an acreage basis. A gas well
was brought in in the vicinity within ten years from the royalty
sale but was shut in for lack of market. A unit was then created
and recorded, including this well and the tract affecting the
royalty in question. The lands of a third person were also in-
cluded but not listed in the recorded instrument. After ten years
from the royalty sale, permission to include the lands of the
third person was secured. A declaration of unitization, reciting
the tract of the third person but otherwise identical with the
first declaration, was then recorded. The Commissioner of Con-
servation authorized production from the shut-in gas well and
dispute arose regarding ownership of the 1/32 royalty. Had pro-
duction occurred within the ten year period on the tract carry-
ing the royalty, the vendees would have been unquestionably
entitled to their share. Since that event had not happened, their
claim must rest upon the first unit declaration. The court found
that despite the very broad power given by the amended lease
provision on pooling, the provision could only mean that the
lessee might unitize with other leases over which similar power
had been given. As outlined above, the unit declaration upon
which the royalty claim depended included the land of a third
person who had not at that time given consent and thus the
*Permission has been granted by Matthew Bender and Company to use certain
cases reported herein as have been reported by the writer in the Oil and Gaa
Reporter, sponsored by the Southwest Legal Foundation of Dallas, Texas, and
published by that company.
**Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 229 La. 316, 86 So.2d 50 (1956).
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unitization was invalid under the terms of the lease. Hence, the
royalty was lost by prescription of ten years.
Strong argument was advanced to support an estoppel. After
the formation of the invalid unit, lessees started paying a per-
centage of land rentals to the lessor as provided in the lease in
event of a shut-in well. One such payment was made before
the expiration of ten years from the royalty sale. The argument
advanced was that these were "shut-in royalties," receipt of
which estopped the lessor from urging prescription of the roy-
alty, which the court stated was tantamount to pleading estoppel
against urging the invalidity of the unitization. The court, after
stressing the fact that estoppel is not favored in the jurispru-
dence, found that the lessor did not have knowledge of all the
facts and of his rights when he accepted the shut-in payments.
Particularly, it was not shown that he knew that an area had
been unitized without consent of the lessor. Thus, there was no
estoppel.
The third argument advanced was that because lessor and
royalty owners had signed the lease amendment authorizing
unitization that the royalty prescription had been interrupted
or extended. The court stated the well-established doctrine in re-
gard to acknowledgment of a servitude that express intent must
be found. Here, there was mere recitation of existence of out-
standing royalty which had no effect on the prescriptive period.
Two Justices dissented mainly on the ground that the consent
of the third person to unitize was a ratification of the invalid
declaration which was retroactive to the date of its confection
and thus within the necessary ten-year period from the sale of
the royalty. These Justices also seemed favorable to the plea of
estoppel.
Adherence to the doctrine of limited application of the trou-
blesome and perhaps dangerous principle of estoppel, particu-
larly in mineral rights, should meet with approbation. There
was no knowledge by the lessor and no detrimental move by
claimants because of apparent assent.
Ratification by the third party to the original unitization
agreement certainly could not affect the interests of others.
Doubtless, had it been attacked, the unitization could not have
stood until subsequent ratification by all parties, which indeed
later occurred.
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Ratification of the unitization or estoppel of its attack would
seem necessarily to be differentiated from consequences between
vendor and vendee of royalty, separate contractors. How could
the fact that the royalty owners and their vendor, a subequent
lessor, signed the amended lease incorporating the unitization
agreement, without mention of a change in the original royalty
sale, affect the law of prescription for this type of royalty?
What did the signatures of the royalty owners add to the lease
in any event? What complaint could they have advanced against
the unitization clause when they could not complain of any other
clause or could not complain even if the land was never leased?
A dissenting Justice advances the thought that an implied
condition existed in the unitization clause of the lease that the
lessee have authorization from all parties subject to the unitiza-
tion and that having met the condition by subsequently securing
consent from the third party, the unitization was validated.
Thus, the implied condition, if it may be labeled a condition, is
stated as a future condition rather than a present requisite of
essential power to unitize.
To amplify further the powers of the lessee specified in most
leases would seem to be both unnecessary and unwise. Economic
factors are recognized by the Conservation Act in the proper
interest of the industry. Similar cognizance in the interest of
the lessor rather than that of the royalty buyer, a knowing pur-
chaser of a most speculative interest without active responsi-
bility, may also be in the interest of the industry and the public.
It might be said that perhaps the most significant and maybe
most far-reaching indication of the majority opinion is the ap-
plication of one of the prescription doctrines, that of acknowledg-
ment with express and clear intent to interrupt and that of clear
intent to extend the life of a servitude. The policy of holding
the application of these doctrines to a minimum in royalty pre-
scription as has been done in servitude is most heartening. When
other parallels are advanced, as well they may be, as for example
to interruption by user, by second production within ten years
of exhaustion of first strike, the court's reaction will indeed be
interesting.2
2. See Note, 16 TUL. L. REV. 154 (1941). Also see Jones, Non-Participating
Royalty, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 569 (1948). Also see Note, 4 LOYOLA L. REV. 194
(1948), and Moses, The Prescriptibility of Royalties in Louisiana, 15 TuL. L. REV.
516 (1940).
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In Amos v. Waggoner3 plaintiff purchased a tract of land in
which the vendor retained one-half of the minerals. He also
retained the full power to lease. Nonetheless plaintiff granted a
lease to the defendant, a broker. The vendor of the land learned
of the transaction though it had not been recorded, notified the
broker that the landowner had no power to lease and returned
the cash paid. After the expiration of the servitude retained by
the vendor of the land, the defendant recorded his lease instru-
ment and deposited a check for delay rentals, which was re-
turned. Suit was filed for failure to pay delay rentals. The court
decided that the lease was invalid and that defendant had recog-
nized it to be by accepting the check in return for the cash pay-
ment. The lease was cancelled and award for attorney's fees
confirmed.
The theory of the defense was interesting, namely, that since
the lessor could not give possession, during the life of the out-
standing servitude and leasing right, the obligation was in full
force and effect, but its operation merely suspended. Thus, no
delay rentals were due until the servitude prescribed whereupon
lessee promptly recorded the lease and paid the rentals.
The court pointed out that the decisions recognizing a sus-
pension were clearly distinguishable as they dealt with situa-
tions where 'suit had been filed by lessee and successfully pur-
sued.
Herein, not only was the lessor without power to lease but
defendant had acquiesced to the invalidity of the lease by ac-
cepting though not cashing the check which covered the initial
payment. Also, the court stated that the payment was bonus and
not delay rental as claimed by defendant.
In Johnson v. Houston Oil Company of Texas4 a sublessee
sued to have his lease declared in effect and to enjoin inter-
ference with his operations. A clause in the sublease provided
that in absence of production or drilling, a reworking operation
must be in existence on a certain date or reversion of the sub-
lease would occur. Thus, the case turned on the factual question
of whether or not reworking of a plugged hole was actually in
progress on the critical date and was begun and continued in
good faith. The court found the trial judge to have been correct
3. 229 La. 134, 85 So.2d 58 (1956).
4. 229 La. 446, 86 So.2d 97 (1956).
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in finding in his evaluation of the evidence that this was the
case.
A salutary rule, that the trial judge's finding of fact may
usually be relied upon, was followed. That the sublessor had
materially important reasons for desiring cancellation appeared
and may have further influenced the court to depend upon the
trial judge's conclusions."
In Nunley v. Shell Oil Company6 the sole question presented
in this chapter of the litigation is whether or not attorney's fees
under a special statute should be allowed for a partial cancella-
tion. After review of jurisprudence with but a federal decision
in clear conflict, the fees were allowed. A concurring Justice felt
that the question turned upon whether or not the statute was
penal requiring strict construction or compensatory for expendi-
ture not otherwise recoverable. He adjudged the latter to be the
intent of the statute.
The decision seems eminently correct, salutary, and within
the bounds of reasonable statutory interpretation. The statute
as applied seems to be a useful deterrent against negligence or
indifference by the party primarily responsible.7
In Childs v. Washington" a landowner sought to have a servi-
tude declared extinguished by prescription of non-user. The
servitude had been created in 1937. In 1941 the landowner had
acknowledged the servitude with intent to interrupt prescrip-
tion. At no time was any land actually covered by the servitude
drilled. However, in 1950, while the servitude was still alive by
virtue of its interruption by acknowledgment, the Commissioner
of Conservation issued orders including part of the land bur-
dened by the servitude in units previously established. There-
after, shares of production from the unit were allocated to the
servitude owners.
5. For a discussion of what constitutes reworking operations within the mean-
ing of lease provisions, see Braly, Problems Presented by Operations During the
Primary Term of an Oil and Gas Lease, SIXTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND-
GAS LAW AND TAXATION 189, 226-228 (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1955).
Also see Note, 32 TEXAS L. REy. 240 (1953), which discusses the case of Rogers
v. Osborn, 2 Oil & Gas Reporter 304 and 1439 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1953), pointing
out that reworking operations commenced after the primary term will not extend
the lease.
6. 229 La. 349, 86 So.2d 62 (1956).
7. See 4 Oil and Gas Reporter 242 for discussion notes regarding the substan-
tive law in this case.
8. 229 La. 869, 87 So.2d 111 (1956).
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There was no question but that the servitude covering that
part of the land within the unit was preserved under clear lan-
guage of the Conservation Act. The issue was regarding the ser-
vitude on land lying outside of the unit which was alleged to
have also been preserved under the indivisibility of servitude
theory. The court decided that since the landowner and servi-
tude owner could by contract divide the servitude, the Commis-
sioner of Conservation acting for the state could do likewise.
This decision should put to rest some troublesome questions
that have been breeders of discontent with the conservation pro-
gram. That an unused servitude covering a large tract should
be maintained indefinitely by virtue of a part of the land in a
unit appeared inequitable and impractical under the purposes of
the Conservation Act. The technical theory of indivisibility of
servitude was a slender and unforeseen and unintended corollary.
The result achieved here is just and follows the true purpose of
the Code and the act. The flexibility of the civil law, enabling
adjustment to changed conditions, social, economic or scientific,
was commented upon by the Chief Justice, author of this opinion.
In Elson v. Mathewes,9 and in this case, the court has again dem-
onstrated the art of creation in the best interests of individual
and state-wide rules for the orderly development of one of the
most important endeavors of Louisiana.
In Boddie v. Drewett0 twelve acres of land burdened by a
servitude were included in a drilling unit ordered by the Com-
missioner of Conservation. The first well drilled was unproduc-
tive and was abandoned. Another permit was secured from the
Commissioner that a well might be drilled off center of the unit.
Production was secured. This case is an action for a declaratory
judgment to determine whether the servitude was interrupted or
suspended.
The court found that the dry hole drilled within the unit but
not on the land burdened by the servitude did not interrupt pre-
scription on the servitude but that the servitude was suspended
by the obstacle of the Commissioner's drilling unit order until
the unsuccessful well was plugged and abandoned. Thus, the
servitude had not prescribed before the second, successful well
was drilled, which did interrupt prescription of the servitude.
9. 224 La. 417, 69 So.2d 734 (1954).
10. 229 La. 1017, 87 So.2d 516 (1956).
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Since the idea of user of servitude within a unit though not
on land covered by the servitude is predicated on production
from the land, it seems entirely logical that an unproductive well
in the unit would not constitute an interruption of prescription.
It is also logical under the servitude theory that suspension by
obstacle should result if user is impossible because of the Com-
missioner's drilling unit order.
In Jumonville Pipe & Machinery Co. v. Federal Land Bank
of New Orleans," certain lands were sold and one-half of the
minerals reserved, thus creating a servitude. Orders of the Com-
missioner of Conservation included portions of the land bur-
dened with the servitude within a unit from which production
was secured during the life of the servitude. The question pre-
sented was whether this production from the unit maintained
the servitude upon the land outside of the unit. The court held
that it did not do so.
This case presented in essence the same question as that posed
in Childs v. Washington, 2 and the decision is grounded upon
the reasoning of that case. Again, the court held that production
within the unit will hold the servitude on undrilled lands within
the unit but not upon undrilled lands outside of the unit.
In Viator v. Haynesville Mercantile Co.'8 a landowner sold a
royalty interest in his land without searching rights. Eight years
later he leased the land. The lease authorized pooling of the land.
The next year a producing gas well was completed but shut in
for lack of market. More than ten years from the royalty sale,
a market became available and gas was produced. Prior to ten
years from the royalty sale, lessee had created a unit containing
part of the land covered by the royalty interest but other leased
land was comprehended in the unit for which authorization was
lacking, rendering the unit invalid. This defect was not cured
until after ten years from the date of the royalty sale. There
having been no production in commercial quantities from a
legally valid unit during the ten years following the royalty sale,
the royalty owner's right was held to have prescribed. Attorneys'
fees under a statute dealing with cancellation of a lease were not
allowed as the statute, being punitive, had to be strictly con-
strued.
11. 230 La. 41, 87 So.2d 721 (1956).
12. 229 La. 869, 87 So.2d 111 (1956).
13. 230 La. 132, 88 So.2d 1 (1956).
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The reasoning of this case tracks a previous decision dealing
with servitude and in both situations the validity of the unit
rules as to land in the unit though not drilled. The physical
actualities seem to be denied but terminal points for these pre-
scriptions need to be fixed with certainty and doubtless the de-
cisions are wise and in the public interest. It is interesting to
note that again prescription on royalty is discussed as one that
may be "interrupted." If the body of law on interruption and
suspension is to be applied, many problems may arise in this
connection.
In LeBlanc v. Haynesville Mercantile Co.1 4 landowners sold
royalty, retaining leasing rights on March 19, 1940. On February
16, 1945, landowners leased. The instrument contained a clause
permitting lessee to pay certain sums instead of royalty in the
event a gas well was brought in and had to be shut in for lack
of market. Power to unitize was also granted to the lessee. On
February 13, 1950, lessee exercised the right to unitize and part
of the land covered by the royalty in question was combined with
land upon which a gas well had previously been successfully
drilled but had been shut in for lack of market. In lieu payments
were made until January 18, 1951, when the well was put into
production. Landowners insisted that the royalty had expired
by lapse of ten years. The court held that prescription had not
run. A well, capable of producing in commercial quantities and
within a valid unit of which the land covered by the royalty
was a part, maintained the royalty. These incidents happened
within ten years from the sale of the royalty. The fact that the
well was not put into production until after the original ten-year
period was provided for in the lease and did not affect the legal
life of the royalty.
It would appear that this decision is logically in line with
decisions dealing with servitude and unitization, cited therein.15
It is interesting and somewhat strange that it was argued by
landowners that the royalty owners not having agreed to the
unitization clause of the lease could not profit thereby when a
royalty sale of this nature is marked by the utter lack of power
in the royalty buyer to lease. The court again explained and
emphasized the nature of the contract of sale of royalty as de-
14. 230 La. 299, 88 So.2d 377 (1956).
15. Union Oil Co. of California v. Touchet, 229 La. 316, 86 So.2d 50 (1956);
Sohio Petroleum Co. v. V. S. & P. R. R., 222 La. 383, 62 So.2d 615 (1952).
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cided in the foundation case of Vincent v. Bullock.'6 It should
again be emphasized that the court used the word "interrupted"
with regard to this type of royalty while reiterating the doc-
trine that the contract of sale depends upon the happening within
ten years of the future uncertain event of production. The ques-
tion of whether the entire royalty was preserved or only that
upon the land included in the unit was improperly raised and
could not be passed upon. Thus, another important point is left
for future settlement.
In Southwest Gas Producing Co. v. Hattie Brothers17 a land-
owner claimed a larger percentage of royalty on the ground
that when certain mineral deeds were signed they thought they
were dealing only with interests inherited from grandparents
and were unaware that their father from whom they also in-
herited had owned a part. The court decided that the words of
the deed, "all of his rights, title and interest," ruled regardless
of what understanding the sellers had in regard to the sources
of their ownership.
The court declared the issue to be one of fact as to what had
been sold and clearly it was all of the interest. Moreover, it ap-
peared that the vendors believed that they owned all, but from
their grandfather only and not from two sources. The rule was
set forth that parties to a contract may have an instrument cor-
rected that it may express the true intent of the parties. An ex-
tended list of authorities were cited in suppose of this doctrine.
However, the burden of proof here was not sustained to show
that the intent was other than that expressed in the instruments.
16. 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
17. 230 La. 339, 88 So.2d 649 (1956).
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